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‘The Curse of the Co-ops’: Co-operation, the Mass Press and the Market in Interwar Britain 
 
 
Early in 1934 Lord Rothermere, owner of the Daily Mail and the Harmsworth Group, the 
largest newspaper combine in the country, published an article in Lord Beaverbrook’s Daily 
Express declaring outright war on the Co-operative movement. The mass press had been 
harrying co-operators for years but Rothermere hoped to bring matters to a head. Carrying 
the inflammatory title, ‘The Curse of the Co-ops’, the article likened the movement to ‘a 
dangerous tumour...eating at the heart of British retail trade.’ It went on to describe how in 
only a few generations the movement had grown from ‘an insignificant association of poor 
men’ merely trying to make ends meet into ‘a powerful group of wealthy corporations with 
huge reserves’. Unless private traders combined ‘to loosen the coils’ of what Rothermere 
colourfully referred to as ‘the co-op boa-constrictor’, they would inevitably be crushed to 
death, he warned.1 According to the socialist co-operator and journalist Sydney Elliott, this 
overt politicisation of consumption in the 1930s had positive effects, leading he believed to 
‘the discovery of the consumer’, or a new awareness of the potential of organised consumer 
power.2 The Norwich co-operator, Fred Henderson, agreed with this analysis, though also 
drew attention to F. D. Roosevelt’s famous 1932 speech in which the President had 
emphasised that in order for the New Deal to be effective people had to ‘think less about 
the producer and more about the consumer.’3 
 
Building on the earlier work of John Stevenson and Chris Cook among others, recent studies 
of interwar Britain by economic and business historians have brought the consumer centre 
stage.4 Peter Scott in particular has demonstrated how the expansion of owner occupation 
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among sections of the working class as well as the middle class fuelled the desire for 
consumer goods, including domestic furniture and vacuum cleaners. Provincial department 
stores sought to both satisfy and stimulate this increase in demand, developing more 
sophisticated forms of advertising and offering more affordable hire-purchase schemes, 
thereby gradually helping to break down working-class reluctance to buy goods on credit.5 
Moreover, greater employment opportunities for young women in sectors of the economy 
such as light engineering and other new industries that grew as the old staple industries 
contracted, increased the purchasing power of female consumers who were soon targeted 
by manufacturers of a host of mass market commodities such as cosmetics, convenience 
foods, magazines and films.6 J. B. Priestley’s famous image of ‘factory girls looking like 
actresses’ remains a fitting symbol of the transformations that were in train.7 Historians of 
gender have also stressed how domestic space was redefined and revalorised between the 
wars – by means of literary and cultural representations as well as by events like ‘The Daily 
Mail Ideal Home Exhibition’ – to produce an identifiably modern sense of the suburban 
‘home’ as a different kind of emotional as well as material site.8 Some scholars have singled 
out the important role played by the mass press in both facilitating consumerism and 
communicating new forms of femininity, and have demonstrated how newspapers such as 
the Daily Mail and Daily Express, far from straitjacketing women in traditional roles, instead 
helped to liberate them.9 There has also been renewed interest in the vital significance of 
the Co-operative movement between the wars, especially for working-class families. 
Extending the chronology of my earlier work and rejecting the narrative of ‘defeat’ that I 
suggested had occurred during the 1920s and 1930s, Nicole Robertson, for example, has 
demonstrated how local co-operative societies in the East Midlands and elsewhere 
continued to help define working-class community life in these decades and well beyond.10   
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However, although this scholarship has greatly enlarged our understanding of both the so-
called ‘new consumerism’ of the interwar years and the vitality of consumer co-operation, 
the role of the Co-operative movement in the wider political culture remains understudied. 
This is surprising, especially given the current interest in the modalities of citizenship in this 
period. Here, the arguments of Ross McKibbin have exerted considerable influence: 
according to him, Conservative hegemony between the wars depended upon the party’s 
ability to assemble a coalition of social groups around ‘conventional wisdoms’ that were 
deeply ingrained in the worldview of the middle classes – including the need for a 
‘deflationary’ fiscal regime and hostility towards socialism and the political working class.11 
Helen McCarthy has questioned this reading, underlining how voluntary organisations, such 
as the British Legion, Rotary International and the Women’s Institute, held a multiplicity of 
views and should not simply be seen as props for Conservative ideology as they are in 
McKibbin’s account. These bodies instead encouraged the growth of active citizenship and 
widened the meaning of democracy during this period.12 This is useful up to a point, for 
sure, but the tendency is to sidestep wider questions concerning political domination in an 
effort to produce a more optimistic reading of citizenship. Moreover, the largest voluntary 
organisation at this time – the British Co-operative movement – is completely overlooked, 
remarkably. It is with this movement and its significance for our understanding of the 
broader interwar political culture that this article is concerned. 
 
Sydney Elliott overstated the case for the discovery of the consumer in the 1930s, certainly, 
for consumption had been overtly politicised during the First World War and in its 
immediate aftermath as we shall see.13 However, his assertion contained more than a grain 
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of truth as the politics of consumption entered a new phase in a context increasingly shaped 
by profound economic and political crises both at home and abroad. Despite this 
unpropitious context, the Co-operative movement not only managed to survive but also 
continued to expand. By the early 1930s, about 6.5 million men and women belonged to an 
organisation that provided invaluable material support for working-class families and 
constituted a vital training ground for democratic participation. The movement’s ideologues 
proclaimed that the great lesson of the depression was that markets ought to be regulated 
by the democratic will of the people and that co-operative success proved that this was 
eminently practicable. This inevitably brought the movement into conflict with business and 
political elites that sought to contain co-operators’ ambition: press barons were in the 
vanguard of the anti-co-operative ‘crusade’ and used their newspapers to try to contain the 
largest democratic movement of consumers Britain had ever had. The first two sections 
below explore the economic and ideological challenge represented by the Co-operative 
movement in order to understand better why co-operation was regarded as anathema by 
big capitalists such as Rothermere and Beaverbrook, provoking an almost visceral hatred. 
Particularly important here was co-operators’ critique of the deleterious effects of 
‘individualism’ and the myth of ‘free’ enterprise given the rapid post-war growth of 
combines and syndicates apparent in many sectors of the economy, including the mass 
press. The remainder of the study discusses the overt political contests of the late 1920s and 
early 1930s in detail. Consideration is first given to co-operators’ thwarted attempts after 
1929 to regulate markets in the interest of working-class shoppers by means of the 
Consumers’ Council Bill. The few existing accounts of this initiative have emphasised its 
contradictory objectives and have underestimated its significance.14 The article then goes on 
to examine the ‘penal’ taxation imposed on the Co-op as a kind of disciplinary measure by 
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the National Government in 1933. Although this represented a notable victory over ‘co-
operative democracy’, the movement’s enemies did not achieve all that they had hoped for, 
and the final sections reflect on why Rothermere and Beaverbrook’s efforts were partially 
checked and what this compromise suggests about the nature of political culture and 
citizenship in Britain during this febrile period. 
 
 
I 
 
 
It was hardly surprising that Lord Rothermere was perturbed by the scale of the Co-
operative movement in interwar Britain, for by any measure it was impressive. The 
membership of 6.5 million in the early 1930s included over a fifth of the population 
between the ages of 16 and 64. There were almost 1,200 local societies, which owned 
around 12,000 shops, 300 warehouses and factories, a bank, an insurance society and a 
national newspaper. The movement was the biggest distributor of tea in the country, milled 
a third of total flour imports and baked one in five loaves. It was bound into capitalism but 
was distinguished from it by two key features: the planned nature of operations allowed the 
movement to remain comparatively free from boom and slump during the depression, and 
the bulk of profit or ‘surplus’ resulting from trade was returned to the consumer or member 
in the form of ‘dividend’. The wholesale and productive societies had an annual trade of 
over £100,000,000 in 1935; despite the difficult circumstances, in the decade ending 1935 
the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) opened nearly 40 new departments, factories 
and workshops. About 300,000 people were co-operative employees, making the 
6 
 
movement second only to government as an employer of labour. Organised consumers 
owned a total of £160,000,000 of capital in retail societies.15 Such facts furnished eloquent 
proof of the efficacy of planning and the democratic control of business. However, there 
were serious underlying weaknesses. Co-operators were outstripped by the multiples and 
department stores in the sale of dry goods – foodstuffs continued to be the mainstay of co-
operative retail trade throughout the interwar years. The movement controlled almost a 
quarter of the national trade by 1939 and was particularly important in the supply of milk 
and bread.16 Also, societies were hit hard in older industrial areas where the movement had 
originally developed in the nineteenth century. However, even there the picture was not 
unrelievedly gloomy: in the north-west, retail societies in large conurbations with diversified 
economies like Manchester fared much better than those dependent on single industries 
such as cotton textiles or mining.17 
 
Most important, the movement made major strides in the south of the country between the 
wars, especially in the capital: membership of the London Co-operative Society alone stood 
at nearly 600,000 by the mid 1930s, with annual sales of over £12 million. Many 
commentators underlined this shift in geographical strength. The statistician of co-
operation, John Hough, compared the state of two societies he had recently visited in 1938, 
one in Rossendale Valley in Lancashire, and the other in Enfield, north London. In the first, 
Hough was struck by ‘an atmosphere of depression...a certain sense of neglect which 
accompanies a slowing-down process in what has once been a thriving and active 
community.’ In Enfield on the other hand he was impressed by ‘a certain dynamic newness. 
New housing estates, new shops and new factories were much in evidence and there was a 
general air of bustle and movement not unmixed with prosperity.’18 This dynamic growth 
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caused even the coolest observers to consider that co-operation held utopian promise. In 
their critical survey the sociologist Alexander Carr-Saunders and his team, for example, 
concluded that co-operative enterprise could expand enabling it eventually to satisfy ‘the 
primary wants of all consumers’ by virtue of control not only of distribution of goods and 
services but also right back to raw materials and the sources of supply, which would result 
in, ‘A complete system of Co-operation...Co-operative retail trading would then become 
only the final stage of a great, self-contained system of direct production for the satisfaction 
of the known wants of consumers.’19 This was precisely what worried press lords like 
Rothermere and Beaverbrook. 
 
Serious obstacles blocked this ambition, however, not least changes in the structure of 
capitalism itself. Co-operators had been concerned about the growth of monopolies and the 
economic behaviour it encouraged since the late nineteenth century. Capitalists had 
increasingly come to appreciate the value of co-operation between themselves and against 
the consumers’ interest, an inversion of the ‘moral economy’ of consumption articulated by 
the Co-operative movement, which aimed to maximise not weaken the power of 
consumers. From the late Victorian period, capitalists used various means in order to better 
organise and control the anarchy of the market – including ‘rings’ or cartels, quotas and 
price-fixing agreements – not in order to give ordinary consumers a better deal but to 
regulate output and maximise profits.20 The depression following World War One helped to 
accelerate continued concentration of capital across industry but also in retailing and 
distribution, which intensified opposition to the Co-op, making it easier for private capital to 
shut competitors out of particular markets; a resolution condemning trusts, combines and 
trade associations was passed at the annual Congress in 1923.21 The power of trade 
8 
 
associations had grown enormously, and these bodies insisted that dividend was an unfair 
rebate on price – a form of price-cutting – and demanded that co-operative societies add it 
to sale price. If societies refused to accept these terms, they were boycotted. Popular 
chemists’ goods and toiletries were controlled by the Proprietary Articles Trade Association 
(PATA), which had pursued an anti-co-operative policy since 1906. The attack was gradually 
widened: the Co-op was shut out of markets for gramophones, bicycles, radios and vacuum 
cleaners among other goods. New combines like the drapery trust sprang up. Chain stores 
tried to undercut societies in some areas, while overcharging where co-operative presence 
was weak.22 
 
The late 1920s witnessed widespread and concerted efforts to develop a co-operative 
boycott. Grocers’ Associations drew up a ‘white list’ of manufacturers and wholesalers who 
refused to supply societies. Unsurprisingly, the national and local co-operative press 
regularly denounced ‘The Menace of the PATA’.23 Moving a resolution against the PATA at 
the Co-operative Congress in 1930, J. T. Davis of the CWS emphasised that the threat 
affected not only luxury goods but also commodities that were in daily use in working-class 
households, including flour, margarine, soap and tea. Davis reported that the organisation 
now comprised a network consisting of 437 manufacturing companies, 63 wholesalers and 
8,700 retail firms. The prices of at least 8,000 articles were under direct control. Davis and 
many other co-operative leaders argued that this trend and the growth of monopoly more 
generally had been encouraged by economic depression and the resulting ‘rationalisation’ 
of industry. The resolution passed by Congress asserted that, ‘only by the substitution of a 
co-operative system of industry for that of rationalised capitalism can the mass of the 
people enjoy in full the wealth created by the efforts of the whole community.’24 The 
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movement, however, was sorely disappointed a year later when the report of the 
committee established by the Board of Trade to investigate co-operators’ complaints 
advised against government intervention to curb what was admitted to be a growing 
problem.25 
 
Anxieties concerning economic transformations, as well as particular grievances during 
wartime, had led the movement to formally enter the political arena in 1917 with the 
foundation of the Co-operative Party.26 It was not immediately clear after the war that the 
Labour Party – which was not yet a truly national party – would dominate the political field 
at the expense of organised consumers; many activists among the latter group thought the 
Co-operative Party would better serve the interests of workers as consumers, just as the 
trade unions sponsored Labour to further the interests of workers as producers.27 Some 
sympathetic Labour leaders hoped for the unification of producer and consumer wings of 
the working class movement: the General Secretary of the Labour Party, Arthur Henderson, 
had argued for a strong alliance between them from 1917, indeed according to G. D. H. Cole 
he had even contemplated joining forces with co-operators in a ‘People’s Party’.28 However, 
during the 1920s the Co-operative Party became marginalised as producers trumped 
consumers within the labour movement and the parliamentary power of the Labour Party 
increased. Relations between different wings of the labour movement soured and the hopes 
of those who had wished to construct a broad front against capitalist monopoly were 
dashed. In some areas co-operators were themselves reluctant to engage politically; though 
the Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society (RACS) affiliated to the Labour Party in 1921, 
providing vital financial support for Labour in the capital thereafter, this proved to be the 
exception rather than the rule.29 In some areas relations became positively acrimonious – in 
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Birmingham and Leicester, for instance.30 Nevertheless, Labour recognised the movement’s 
importance and four Co-operative Party MPs were given minor ministerial office in 1924. 
Many co-operators were opposed to the Cheltenham Agreement of 1927, which attempted 
to patch things up (it was only passed at Congress by 117 votes out of over 3,800). This 
agreement allowed local Co-operative parties to affiliate to divisional Labour parties with 
representation and voting rights in proportion to numbers affiliated but it was voluntary and 
did not replace existing arrangements. It was, therefore, a fudge: it was regarded as both a 
step towards absorption by the Labour Party and as an assertion of independence for it 
helped defeat those co-operators who wanted direct affiliation. Initially, the agreement 
worked quite well – the Co-operative Party endorsed Labour candidates in the 1929 general 
election, winning a total of nine seats and once again receiving ministerial posts in return – 
though relations were soon strained.31 In short, co-operators’ political influence at the 
centre was limited, though not negligible. 
 
 
II 
 
 
It is worth reflecting on why press barons were so hostile towards the Co-operative 
movement at this time. After all, though there were sporadic attacks on the movement 
before the First World War from private traders and immediately afterwards from some 
local Conservative Associations, business and political elites across the ideological spectrum 
had tended historically to applaud consumer co-operation for its ‘civilising’ effects on 
working-class culture.32 Significantly, in his declaration of war Rothermere had emphasised 
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that it was not only the sheer scale of the co-operative challenge that was so threatening 
but also the fact that its leaders had for years declared that their avowed purpose was ‘to 
eliminate the principle of individualism in commerce.’33 Rothermere  and Beaverbrook 
regarded themselves as the apotheosis of this principle, natural leaders who had gained 
financial and political power by virtue of their own relentless competitive drive. That was 
why they were attracted to ‘great men’ and found the discipline of party objectionable, 
Beaverbrook backing Winston Churchill against Stanley Baldwin and Rothermere eventually 
siding with Oswald Mosley. The role of the charismatic individual and ‘individualism’ as a 
guiding principle of social action were bedrock beliefs and diametrically opposed to the 
ethical foundations of ‘socialism’ in its various guises, which emphasised the will of the 
majority.34 For the press barons, ‘individualism’ was what guaranteed the progressive 
workings of capitalist ‘free’ enterprise and those who questioned its usefulness or 
endangered its operation – whether Bolsheviks, or socialists, or co-operators – were by 
crushing ambition both resisting the movement of history and reducing the chances of 
individual self-advancement. Although their antagonists typically portrayed them as 
autocratic monopolists, Rothermere and Beaverbrook embraced the cause of small traders 
as they considered themselves products of a social group from which enterprising 
individuals who could grasp opportunities and push themselves to the top most frequently 
emerged. It was a simple, atomised worldview, and resolutely optimistic. The mass press 
never tired of articulating such themes to its readers. The Daily Express published a 
statement of political belief by Herbert Hoover on his inauguration as President in 1929, for 
example, the editor heartily endorsing Hoover’s manifesto as ‘a downright proclamation of 
himself as an unashamed individualist, and of individualism as the only policy that makes for 
national well-being.’ The President’s message, the editor continued, ought to resonate on 
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this side of the Atlantic where ‘we are confused with talk of Socialism, and with the 
pernicious idea that committees can ever take the place of personal leadership.’ From early 
1931, the paper’s editorials were headed: ‘The Daily Express believes in political 
independence, in Empire Free Trade, in protection for the manufacturing and agricultural 
industries, in individualism and equality of opportunity.’ ‘Individualism’ undergirded these 
disparate commitments, including Empire Free Trade, as Britain’s overseas territories had 
proved a forcing bed for those ‘manly’ virtues which Beaverbrook so approved.35 
 
The spread of co-operation refuted the idea that business success was dependent on 
‘individualism’ and autocratic leadership. Though Rothermere and Beaverbrook paid lip 
service to democracy, they tended to regard the majority primarily as ‘the masses’, gullible, 
passive consumers to be hoodwinked and cajoled. The Co-operative movement alternatively 
embodied a much more active sense of consumer practice and citizenship. Working-class 
men and women participated as members of retail societies in a frequent round of quarterly 
meetings and elections to local and national bodies, including management and education 
committees, men’s and women’s guilds, annual congresses and boards of wholesale 
societies. Admittedly, the most active members were always relatively small in number 
compared to total membership, though all were encouraged to regard the movement as a 
quintessentially collective endeavour: the regular distribution of surplus as dividend brought 
this home in the most practical way and co-operative advertising also was frequently 
framed in terms of working-class ownership and control.36 The Co-operative movement 
undoubtedly taught a great many ordinary people valuable lessons in both the practice and 
meaning of democracy. Mary Stott, who came from a liberal middle-class background and 
who had been largely insulated from the realities of working-class life until she began work 
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as a journalist on the Co-operative Press in 1933, later recalled this aspect of the movement 
in vivid detail and stressed how vital this training in democratic participation was, for 
working-class women in particular. ‘I loved and venerated the women of the co-operative 
movement’, Stott wrote, ‘whose courage, persistence and loyalty seemed to me often 
heroic, for though most of them were under-educated and many were scarcely above the 
poverty line, they learned to speak in public, go on deputations, organise and preside at 
great conferences.’ What struck her most forcibly about the Women’s Co-operative Guild 
(WCG) was, ‘the training it gave in the art of government, its completely democratic 
structure.’37 
 
Not surprisingly, the assault on organised consumers strengthened the belief in co-operative 
circles that what was at stake was nothing less than the survival of democracy itself. Sydney 
Elliott, for instance, portrayed the contest over taxation as quintessentially about the ability 
of working-class consumers to determine the future of their own organisations. The most 
important moral to be drawn from it was that political and economic issues were now 
bound together indissolubly. The movement was regarded as a living example of the 
viability of democracy in business: the urgent task was to endow this organisation with real 
political power. Drawing attention to the half million new members that affiliated to the Co-
operative Party in 1930, for example, Elliott optimistically predicted that soon ‘organised 
consumers will be hammering out policies on the anvil of their own experiences as traders 
and financiers. Then Business and Democracy will link arms in their march along the road to 
progress.’38 The intention of press lords and ‘profiteers’ was regarded as an attempt to halt 
the spread of democratic forms across both political and economic domains and their attack 
on co-operation was construed therefore as an attack on democracy itself. The domestic 
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and international context lent vital urgency here. Co-operative ideologues represented their 
movement as besieged by enemies at home and abroad, threatened most directly by 
fascism: A. V. Alexander referred to Beaverbrook as the ‘newspaper Mussolini’, while the 
danger posed by Mosley and the Blackshirts, openly supported from 1934 by Rothermere, 
was repeatedly emphasised.39 Fascist persecution of co-operation on the continent was 
reported in detail in the movement press, the implication being that what was happening in 
Italy, Germany and Austria could quite easily happen here unless organised consumers 
stood firm.40 Alexander and others drew from this experience the conclusion that the only 
real alternative to fascism and dictatorship nationally and internationally lay in the 
establishment of what became commonly referred to as a ‘co-operative democracy’.41  
 
The actions of the press barons focussed co-operators’ anxieties about the increasing 
concentration of capital that have already been noted. Indeed, the mass press itself was 
regarded as embodying this dangerous, anti-consumer trend. Ownership and control of the 
press were completely transformed from the late nineteenth century, and although 
historians have tracked changes back into the earlier period, the significance of the 
‘Northcliffe revolution’ cannot be denied.42 The development of the mass press was 
connected internally to the development of mass consumerism: the spread of affordable, 
branded and heavily advertised goods targeted at a national market depended on the 
popularity of cheap national daily and Sunday papers, which in turn depended on 
advertising revenue to subsidise their sale. The idea that opinion as well as things were now 
packaged and marketed in distinctively modern ways by a new breed of capitalists was a 
theme of co-operative discourse from the early twentieth century onwards.43 The Co-
operative News argued that the syndicated modern daily press not only aimed to amuse 
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rather than instruct readers, it also represented an ominous threat to the future of 
democracy itself. Editorials denounced ‘The Menace of the Press Combine’ and the 
Harmsworth press was seen as a major propagandist tool for capitalism, demonstrating that 
just as it was a bad thing ‘for capitalist syndicates to control the supply of goods for public 
consumption, it is surely infinitely worse for capitalist syndicates to control the supply of 
information upon which public opinion is based.’ The national chauvinism whipped up by 
the press during the First World War clearly demonstrated that the world ‘will never be safe 
for democracy’ so long as the concentration of ownership and power in this field 
continued.44 Norman Angell’s study published after the war, which condemned what he 
described as the ‘industrialised press’ or the ‘Trust press’ for progressively undermining free 
expression and debate, strengthened such beliefs among co-operators. Angell warned that 
the mass press represented ‘the most powerful instrument’ used by elites to mould the 
people to their will: ‘Through it our economic Prussianism can control the nation’s mind, 
form its opinions, direct its passions, determine its judgements.’45 
 
The anti-co-operative cause was fervently taken up by the Beaverbrook and Rothermere 
press from the late 1920s. Following the agreement with Labour in 1927, the Daily Express 
informed readers that the Co-operative movement had been captured by the ‘Socialist 
Party’, against the wishes of the majority of its members who were either Liberals or 
Conservatives and did not want their movement to meddle in politics; while the Daily Mirror 
declaimed against ’Forced Socialism for the Millions.’ Conflicts within local co-operative 
societies over the issue of political affiliation, however slight, were eagerly reported. 
According to the Daily Mail, the majority of those who used the stores were only interested 
in the material benefits derived from co-operative trading, and the movement had been 
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captured by an unrepresentative clique of individuals such as the Co-operative Party MP 
Alfred Barnes – regularly singled out for abuse – who paid themselves high salaries and used 
the movement to pursue their own narrow political agenda. The mass press continued to 
pursue this line throughout the rest of the interwar period.46 Not only was the Co-op a front 
for socialism, moreover, it also treated its employees badly by paying lower wages than 
private firms and cutting jobs with more alacrity. And to cap it all, the organisation was 
thoroughly unpatriotic, buying machinery from Germany and trading in ‘dumped’ goods, 
including butter and wheat imported by the CWS from communist Russia.47  
 
The Co-operative movement made determined efforts to counter this propaganda, by 
means of its own press, for example, which it had owned for over fifty years. Its 
productions, however, were mostly read by the converted and co-operators faced major 
problems with distribution: the weekly Co-operative News as well as more specialised 
publications such as Millgate Monthly and the children’s magazine Our Circle, had to be sold 
through the stores for the movement was boycotted by proprietors of the mass press, 
wholesale houses and the Retail Newsagents’ Federation, and was also not allowed to set 
up its own specialist outlets.48 There was an increasing awareness that attacks by 
Beaverbrook and Rothermere could only be countered effectively by reaching out to a wider 
readership. Thus, in 1929 the National Co-operative Publishing Society purchased the 
Sunday paper, Reynolds’s News, with capital raised from local societies, in an attempt to 
check the pernicious influence of press lords whilst simultaneously providing a more 
effective means of advertising co-operatively-produced goods, to make their own 
newspaper ‘their shop window.’ There were fears at the beginning, voiced by more straight-
laced elements who did not want ‘horrors’ in a co-operative paper. But these voices were 
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not listened to and Reynolds’s News became one of the most imaginative and successful 
left-wing papers in modern British history, combining salacious gossip and photographs of 
bathing beauties and film stars with articles about the threat of fascism and the necessity 
for a Co-operative Commonwealth. Circulation grew from 400,000 copies a week when the 
paper was initially purchased to 415,000 seven weeks later.49 The political urgency of the 
venture was underscored from the outset. The Plymouth co-operator T. W. Mercer, for 
example, regarded the growth of the mass press as a key component part of the 
accelerating process of ‘trustification’; newspapers since Northcliffe were primarily ‘articles 
of commerce, and in that respect no different from any brand of ale or make of soap’, linked 
aspects of ‘the whole system of capitalism by which the masses of the people are 
perpetually exploited, both as producers and as consumers.’ Mercer saw the ‘Trustified 
Press’ as nothing less than a kind of ‘gigantic gramophone’ for capitalist ideology.50 The 
experience of the crisis years of the late 1920s and early 1930s served only to reinforce such 
views within the movement. 
 
 
III 
 
 
Co-operators attempted to dispel the mystifications of the mass press and shape 
conceptions of the economy in the popular mind more than any other radical group in 
modern times, except perhaps for the Chartists. They argued that the so-called 
‘rationalisation’ of industry served only to strengthen monopoly power and that the most 
effective way of checking this was through legislation. Their critique intensified after the 
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Labour Party won the 1929 general election. Demands for legislative intervention to protect 
consumers took place during a particularly active phase of mergers within the distributive 
and retailing sectors of the economy. Reynolds’s News repeatedly exposed what it called the 
‘New Food Monopoly Menace’, demonstrated how retail prices had not fallen in line with 
wholesale prices of bread and meat in particular, and urged the government to safeguard 
consumers against a ‘fresh outbreak of profiteering in food supplies’, as some traders were 
‘preparing to fleece the public as efficiently as they did in war time.’51 The Co-operative 
News also educated consumers about the economic changes that were occurring, publishing 
diagrammatic representations of the complex holdings and organisational structure of the 
recently formed ‘margarine trust and grocery combine’ that resulted from mergers between 
Van den Berghs, Jurgens and Lever Brothers, which led to the creation of Unilever Limited in 
England and Unilever NV in Holland. When this merger came into force in 1930 the 
company controlled thousands of high street shops, trading under well-know names such as 
Home and Colonial Stores, Liptons and Mac Fisheries.52 
 
The record of the 1920s demonstrated that curbing such giants would not be easy. Facing 
mounting criticism of ‘profiteering’, the coalition government had investigated the 
operation of trusts and combines at the end of World War One, but despite the fact that the 
Committee on Trusts which reported in 1919 contained damning evidence, no action was 
taken.53 Pressure did not abate, however, and anti-profiteering discourse and the figure of 
the poor consumer remained central within political culture. The Conservative Party 
responded to this challenge most imaginatively, stealing an opportunity from Labour.54 
Recognising the importance of the consumer the party’s leader, Stanley Baldwin, promised 
to address popular grievances during the 1924 general election campaign. The Royal 
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Commission on Food Prices he set up following the election clearly demonstrated how 
consumer capitalists such as Lord Vesty had rigged the meat market to boost profits. 
Baldwin’s government responded by establishing a Food Council that could recommend 
action to traders but had no compulsory powers. Disappointed by this ineffective body, the 
Co-operative Party introduced a Trust and Combines Bill in 1925 but that quickly failed.55 
 
With the election of the second Labour Government five years later co-operators had 
reason to be hopeful. They now had a total of nine MPs and a reasonably good working 
relationship with the Labour Party. However, tensions remained and co-operators’ 
suspicions increased after Labour took office. The party supported failing industries by 
means of the Coal Mines Act of 1930 and the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1931, which 
inflated prices. Co-operative politicians such as Fred Longden and A. V. Alexander 
maintained, with good reason, that this new ‘regulatist’ legislation served to merely 
entrench the position of capitalist owners and shareholders and subordinate the interests of 
consumers to those of producers. Longden regarded the London Passenger Transport Bill of 
1931 as a supreme example of what he called the ‘new orientation’ and condemned the 
vision of the Minister of Transport, Herbert Morrison, as the antithesis of socialism, a prop 
used to shore up a decaying capitalist economy.56 To complicate matters further, co-
operators were historically wedded to free trade finance and although many Labour leaders 
shared this commitment, differences were opening up within the labour movement; the 
appeal of protectionist intervention to protect British jobs was not confined to Baldwinite 
Conservatives or supporters of Empire Free Trade. Under pressure of the world depression 
and 'dumping' of goods, the Trades Union Congress in 1930 accepted that some protection 
for producers was now desirable, for example, and the growth of monopolies only served to 
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strengthen arguments against old economic shibboleths.57 Moreover, Labour in office 
encouraged the concentration of industrial and financial power, including within the 
retailing sector, according to the Co-operative News, ‘without demanding any guarantees 
whatever that the interests of the masses, as consumers and producers, would be 
maintained.’58 Notwithstanding these unpropitious signs, a Consumers’ Council Bill was 
drafted by the Joint Parliamentary Committee of the Co-operative Union. The Bill sought to 
establish a Consumers’ Council that would allow the Board of Trade to investigate the 
practices of trade associations and private companies in order to restrain prices. The mass 
press was highly critical from the outset. When the Bill was unveiled, it was immediately 
denounced for planning to grant ‘drastic and unprecedented powers’ to a council of seven 
people, who would be able to summon witnesses, examine accounts and, in principle, set 
prices for food, clothes, fuel and a host of other commodities.59 
 
The second reading of the Bill provoked lengthy debate in the Commons on 8 May 1930. 
Supporters including William Graham, President of the Board of Trade, highlighted the 
severity of a cost of living crisis that bore heavily on poor consumers who he maintained still 
faced rocketing prices for basic foodstuffs such as bread and milk, despite the recent fall in 
world prices. The Food Council was portrayed as a conspicuous failure and capitalists were 
charged with ‘profiteering’ as they had done in the war. In short, in thrall to monopoly 
power, the ordinary consumer was getting a raw deal.60 However, it was the ‘socialist’ 
character of the measure that was contested most fiercely. Graham denied that the Bill was 
‘definitely socialist’, and those further to the left like Frank Wise and Jennie Lee agreed, the 
latter nevertheless accepting that it might help check ‘profiteering’ and was at least ‘an 
ounce of practice.’ Conservative opponents led by Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister denounced the 
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‘orgy of despotic price-fixing’ that he warned the Bill would unloose and asserted, ‘This is 
not Socialism by the back door; it is Socialism through the front door.’61 In support, 
Conservative backbenchers harked back to the French and Bolshevik Revolutions where 
price-fixing had been tried and had failed, the Oxford MP and military historian Sir Charles 
Oman concluding: ‘Modern Russia may be regarded as an example of what comes from 
trying, with the best of intentions, to fix prices for the “proletariat”’. In accordance with 
their longstanding critique, Co-op Party MPs argued that the unbridled power of trusts was 
the root cause of consumer exploitation, Walter Smith, the Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Board of Trade who had sat on the Royal Commission on Food Prices five years before, for 
example, rhetorically asked, ‘what is the use of talking about competition solving this 
problem of giving the people food at prices that are reasonable and fair when you have 
combinations and monopolies preventing supplies reaching the people?’62 A few Liberal 
MPs also spoke out against the stranglehold exerted on the consumer by the combines, 
including Herbert Samuel, who hoped, however, that the Bill would be watered down in 
committee; and Harry Nathan, Liberal MP for Bethnal Green, who proved an 
uncompromising critic of Tory cant about the free market: ‘You have the great vertical and 
horizontal trusts, and price rings, which are open to the public gaze, and the concealed 
trusts which can be found out only by such investigations as are contemplated by the Bill.’63 
 
Soon after the Commons debate J. H. Maggs, chairman of United Dairy Company that had 
only recently ignored the Food Council’s recommendation to reduce its prices, tried to 
dismiss the Bill as evidencing ‘the fatal ease with which experts in the stimulation of class 
antagonism can rally consumers to the cry of “War on the Profiteer!”’64 Co-operators as we 
have seen were in the frontline of this war. An editorial in the Co-operative News entitled 
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‘Exploitation of Consumers Must Stop’, which reported the debate in the Commons, 
ridiculed articles in the Sunday Express owned by ‘one of the Capitalist Press Combines’ that 
championed free competition and the housewife’s ability to exact the best deal unaided. 
The editor of the News, J. A. Flanagan, argued that although Baldwin had attempted to 
appease consumers with the ineffectual Food Council, action against ‘profiteers’ was as 
urgent as ever.65 The WCG also condemned the Food Council, pointing out that recent 
attempts to drive up the price of bread by millers and bakers had been thwarted not by this 
body but by the Co-op. The Guild lent their support to the Bill at their annual conference 
towards the end of June, Mrs Hewitson stating that it would provide a much-needed 
weapon in the struggle against ‘trustification’: ‘legislation is necessary to prevent the 
activities of price-fixing associations, such as the PATA, and to deal with trusts and combines 
acting against the consumers’ interests.’66 
 
During the following months, the Bill was discussed in detail. Some co-operators were not 
uncritical. W. B. Neville, secretary of the RACS, for example, did not oppose the measure but 
stressed, like many other co-operators, that state intervention would be unnecessary if 
working-class consumers only dealt with the stores. From this perspective, the need for 
action was a symptom of the disloyalty of members, a staple theme of co-operative 
discourse for decades. Neville also criticised the Bill for not going far enough; private 
companies he argued should be obliged like the Co-op to publish their trading accounts. The 
Bill had a rough passage when it went into committee and towards the end of June, the 
Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, declared that it would be withdrawn owing to lack of 
time. The editor of the News blamed ‘Conservative obstructionists’ for this ‘cruel 
disappointment’ and also emphasised that boosting consumer demand by reducing the 
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margin between wholesale and retail prices would eventually increase employment, vital to 
meet an economic crisis characterised by low wages and high prices. Labour was weak 
Flanagan concluded, ‘not because it is revolutionary, but because it is too moderate.’67 
MacDonald promised action in an interview with Reynolds’s News, however, and the paper 
enthusiastically reported ‘State Grip on the Profiteers’ when the Bill was eventually 
resubmitted in November.68 
 
The fact that the Labour government was in a parliamentary minority of course did not help 
matters and it was teetering on the verge of collapse from the spring of 1931, with the 
Conservative opposition now able and willing to try to bring it down. Nevertheless, hopes 
still ran high in co-operative circles that a breakthrough would be made. When the Bill 
passed its Second Reading, despite vigorous attempts by Conservatives to torpedo it with 
amendments, the editor of the News was almost ecstatic. The appointment of A. V. 
Alexander to steer the Bill through committee in the summer of 1931 made the outlook 
appear even more optimistic. Badgered by Conservative members throughout raucous 
meetings, however, Alexander faced a herculean task. Countless amendments, including 
one to ban co-operative members from serving on the Council, dragged proceedings out 
interminably. Opponents quoted attacks on ‘profiteering’ from the Co-operative News to 
expose the political motives behind the measure. Labour Party members on the committee 
proved unreliable also and Co-operative MPs had sometimes to scour the House to make up 
required numbers. In the country, private traders went on the offensive: J. R. Robinson, 
president of the Federation of Grocers’ Associations, attacked ‘that monstrosity called the 
Consumers’ Council Bill’. Nevertheless, the editor of the News still considered the Bill’s 
passage ‘probable’ at the end of June after MacDonald got approval from the Commons to 
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expedite the committee stage by allowing amendments to be jumped over. But by then a 
Bill that was riddled with contradictions from the outset had already been emasculated. 
Most important, the clause making provision for obtaining information and examining 
witnesses was deleted.69 Even if the Labour Government had not fallen at the end of 
August, the opportunity to regulate markets democratically and protect working-class 
consumers had been lost.70 
 
 
IV 
 
 
Alarmed by the threat of market regulation, the enemies of co-operation went on the 
offensive after the National Government was elected in October 1931. The movement was 
now more vulnerable; the Co-op Party won only a single seat in the general election, while 
the number of official Labour MPs was reduced to forty-six, despite the fact that its share of 
the popular vote remained buoyant. During the election, the Daily Express portrayed the Co-
operative movement as an unpatriotic, socialist organisation, beyond the pale of a political 
coalition designed to serve the national interest during an emergency.71 Afterwards, anti-co-
operative forces focussed their energies on the most obvious target: the tax exemptions 
enjoyed by co-operative societies. Under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act of 1893 
that created a legal framework for co-operative activity, membership of societies had to be 
unlimited, each member had one vote regardless of the number of shares held, and any 
surplus that resulted from mutual trading had to be distributed as ‘dividend’. Societies were 
exempted from income tax under Schedules C and D so long as they placed no limitation on 
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membership. Mutual trading was therefore regarded as different from profit making. 
Societies were still liable for tax under Schedules A and B, income from occupation of land, 
and individuals whose personal income exceeded the exemption limit were taxable on 
interest received from share or loan capital. Under the Income Tax Act of 1918 the surplus 
resulting from mutual trade was accepted as different to profit and therefore not taxable.72 
Months before the election, the Daily Mail had asserted that many non-members regularly 
used the stores, thus violating a key principle of mutuality, and calculated that if the 
movement was treated the same as private traders it would have to pay about £4.5 million 
extra to the Treasury per annum. Calls for the taxation of co-operative surplus had been 
heard for decades but signs that the National Government would take action were 
promising as Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had made it illegal for 
dividend to be paid on prescriptions dispensed by co-operative societies when the 
Conservatives were previously in office.73 
 
Existing studies of the struggle over taxation of co-operative societies at this juncture tend 
to endorse the misleading judgement  of the young Harold Macmillan, who described it as a 
‘comparatively limited issue.’74 For co-operators, this was a momentous struggle as they 
considered the principle of mutuality to be at stake, on which depended the future of their 
movement. Trade organisations and Chambers of Commerce, supported by the mass press, 
maintained pressure to tax societies more severely in the early months of 1932, 
representing the movement as a giant ‘co-operative octopus’, spreading its tentacles ever 
wider and squeezing the life out of free enterprise. Backing demands made by the 
Association of British Chambers of Commerce in their report to Chamberlain, the Daily 
Express argued that the advantageous tax position designed to benefit small organisations 
26 
 
and encourage working-class thrift was now inappropriate and morally wrong, as the 
majority of the 6.5 million members were little more than ‘sheep’ dominated by a ‘socialist 
caucus’.75 The paper even enlisted the help of the grandson of E. O. Greening, the old co-
operative pioneer who had tried to keep the movement out of formal politics at the end of 
World War One, C. B. Greening recalling how his grandfather had warned against ‘anything 
in the nature of Red propaganda.’ Dissension within local societies was eagerly reported and 
the paper maintained that splits were opening up between London and the provinces, the 
latter dominated by non-political societies that were only interested in the material benefits 
conferred by mutual trade. Such charges were not without foundation: a delegate at the 
1932 annual conference of the Co-op Party ruefully observed how the movement ‘had to be 
kicked into the political field. I am not going to say that even now every co-operator is a 
political co-operator – too many of them read the Daily Express.’76 
 
During the Budget debate in April 1932, Chamberlain announced his intention to establish 
an ‘impartial committee’ to investigate the tax position of co-operative societies. Its 
conclusions seemed predetermined to co-operators, especially as Chamberlain publicly 
accepted claims that the principle of mutuality was being breeched and expressed his belief 
that it was ‘highly undesirable’ that the taxation system should cause ‘a burning sense of 
injustice’ among the ‘general trading community’. In private he was deeply worried, 
confiding to his sister Ida before his Budget speech that ‘Co-ops are a terrible tangle and I 
don’t see my way through.’77 When appointees to the Raeburn Committee were announced 
co-operators’ fears were confirmed. A. V. Alexander angrily complained that to call the 
committee impartial was ‘an insult to our intelligence’ as one of its three members, H. L. 
Hill, was on the board of directors of Peter Robinson, the department store, and the 
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Columbia Gramophone Company, which was actively boycotting the movement.78 
Monopoly power, working through the mass press, was seen as underlying the attack. 
Reynolds’s News exposed the workings of Unilever – the ‘World Wide Trade Octopus’ – 
including the fact that William May, a director of Express Newspapers, was also chairman of 
Home and Colonial Stores, the main retail arm of Unilever; while a speaker at a WCG 
conference complained: ‘the controllers of these Big Businesses called the co-operative 
movement an octopus, and said nothing about their Big Business being an octopus.’ R. A. 
Palmer represented organised consumers as beleaguered on all sides; ‘challenged in the 
market place, in Parliament, and in the Press by those who represent the capitalist 
combines which are anti-social in their influence.’79 Even ‘non-political’ bodies such as the 
BBC and the Women’s Institute now seemed to be against them.80 
 
Over the months following Chamberlain’s announcement, the mass press published a 
steady stream of anti-co-operative invective. The old themes were deployed but the tone 
became shriller. Leading co-operative politicians such as Alfred Barnes and A. V. Alexander 
were demonised as opportunistic entryists who were using the movement to pursue a 
socialist agenda, against the wishes of the majority as usual. The series of pamphlets issued 
by the Co-op Party under the title Britain Reborn strengthened the case for regarding 
socialism and co-operation as synonymous; they called for public ownership of banking, 
transport and power, the conversion of state marketing boards into co-operatives and, most 
important, ‘drastic action to bring monopolies under collective ownership and control.’81 
However, the co-operative press strongly rebutted Beaverbrook’s accusations, describing 
him as a ‘sad case’ who was suffering from ‘a malignant type of megalomania’ caused by 
consumers’ growing political power. Reynolds’s News emphasised that the seventeen 
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societies in London and the south that had embraced politics most wholeheartedly had also 
prospered tremendously – increasing annual turnover from £19 million in 1925 to nearly 
£30 million five years later – and asked, ‘Is it any wonder that the Daily Express sees red 
every time it mentions the Co-operative Movement?’ The editor of the Co-operative News 
pointed to the root of the contest: ‘Individualism is the antithesis of co-operation; the 
progress of co-operation involves the elimination of the Express system with all its 
exploitation. Any announcement of co-operative progress is, to the individualist, like a red 
rag to a bull.’82 
 
Much to co-operators’ chagrin, the Government refused to publish evidence given to the 
Raeburn Committee, which listened sympathetically to private traders who claimed that co-
operative societies were both shutting out the poor by charging too much and undercutting 
them by paying dividend. Responding to Hill’s attacks during its final proceedings, A. V. 
Alexander restated co-operators’ position: ‘We associate together not that we may make a 
profit, but that we may by our mutuality have the most economic spending of our members’ 
income...Income tax law clearly lays down that a man in such circumstances trading with 
himself cannot make a profit out of himself.’83 Officials from the Board of Trade and the 
Inland Revenue sided with traders and maintained that co-operative surplus resulted from 
profit-making, not mutual trade. It came as no surprise then when the committee supported 
removing exemption for co-operative societies under Schedules C and D, (which would have 
resulted in about £1.2 million extra tax payable the previous year), when it reported in 
February 1933. The Committee accepted that co-operators’ argument in relation to mutual 
trade may have been reasonable in the past but that the organisation was now far too large 
for the principle to apply. It recommended an illogical compromise: the dividend should be 
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treated as a trade expense and thus be exempt still, while undistributed ‘profits’ ought to be 
taxed.84 Getting the measure through Parliament did not prove easy, despite the 
Government’s large majority. The mass press maintained pressure on Chamberlain but 
many worried about the effects of this measure at the polls. In late April, the Daily Express 
was reporting Cabinet deadlock. Chamberlain had to bridge serious divisions and win over 
Labour and Liberal members, including the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, J. H. 
Thomas and Sir John Simon. The latter proved more reluctant to fall in behind him than did 
Labour leaders; as Simon confided privately to Chamberlain, in his own constituency in West 
Yorkshire most of his best supporters were co-operators and he was in for ‘a devil of a 
time’.85 
 
‘The Great Tax Ramp’ as it became known by co-operators was regarded as a direct 
‘Challenge to Democracy’, and they responded by organising what was described with some 
justification as ‘the greatest democratic campaign of modern times.’ The slogan ‘No Penal 
Taxation’ was adopted, hundreds of societies contributed to a fighting fund that quickly 
amounted to thousands of pounds, numerous meetings were held and signatures collected 
for a mass petition. Members were encouraged to sign the latter when they shopped at the 
stores; in rural Suffolk, deliverymen took the petition with them on their rounds. Some 
societies were very imaginative: Dartford co-operators made a short film protesting against 
the tax plans and tried to get it shown in local cinemas; milk bottle tops used by the 
Brighton Society were embossed, ‘Beware the Private Trader and the Tax Raider.’ Taxation 
of reserves was regarded as inevitably leading to taxation of the divi, which would have 
disastrous consequences. Co-operative propaganda portrayed the measure as a blatant 
example of class robbery: Eleanor Barton of the WCG called it a ‘smash-and-grab raid’, while 
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the Labour MP Arthur Greenwood denounced the tax as ‘class legislation’ at Brighton.86 At a 
National Emergency Conference held on 4 April at Central Hall, Westminster, an audience of 
around 2,000 delegates heard combative speeches by co-operative, Labour and trade union 
leaders. Mrs Lightfoot, the Seaham co-operator who had famously forced MacDonald to 
pledge that the divi would be safe under Labour during the 1929 general election, caused 
great amusement with the taunt, ‘I’ve been waiting for him to come back to Seaham ever 
since.’ Alfred Barnes rather optimistically suggested that by taxing this working-class 
organisation the government may have ‘signed the death warrant of capitalism.’ Delegates 
invaded the Commons afterwards and presented petitions to constituency MPs, though 
some Tories managed to slip away.87 The total number of signatures collected amounted to 
3,428,000, making it the largest petition to parliament since the Chartist period, a fact 
repeatedly emphasised in the co-operative press.88 
 
Fearing the electoral effects of this agitation, Chamberlain worked in private to strike a 
compromise, but failed to reach agreement with co-operative representatives. His 
backbenchers clamoured for action and, eager to quell fascist appeals, Chamberlain was 
ready to appease small traders. The contest became more acrimonious as CWS officials 
were unfairly accused of graft in Parliament.89 MacDonald was lampooned from all sides 
and lost any remaining credit he had left in co-operative circles. A. V. Alexander called for 
the Prime Minister’s resignation and both he and Thomas were condemned as ‘renegades’ 
who had ‘ratted’ on their erstwhile friends.90 The Cabinet agreed to support Chamberlain in 
early May and legislation drawn up according to the recommendations of the Raeburn 
Committee was forced through. The Chancellor was nervous until the vote but held up 
better than MacDonald, confiding to his sister Hilda that he felt ‘quite sorry’ for the Prime 
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Minister during the heated taxation debate on 22 May: ‘Sitting next him on the bench I 
could feel him trembling all over and when he got up his face was quite ghastly.’91 
Government victory was hardly surprising, though the issue provoked the biggest vote 
against them since the general election: 328 in favour to 109 against, including 15 
Conservatives, 27 Liberals and 11 Liberal National MPs. The debate in the Commons was 
heated. Though there was only one Co-op Party MP in Parliament, the movement had some 
staunch allies, including William Cove, MP for Aberavon (McDonald’s old constituency in 
South Wales), who argued that co-operation had been attacked because it stood for ‘the 
germ of changes in society as a whole.’92 The illogicality if not the unfairness of this measure 
was widely acknowledged outside the movement. The Times noted how since its publication 
‘much doubt has been cast both upon the accuracy and upon the practicability’ of the 
Raeburn Committee’s report; while The Economist lamented how ‘the petty yield to the 
Exchequer is hardly likely to counterbalance the veritable political hornet’s nest which the 
Government has seen fit to stir up.’93 
 
 
V 
 
 
The Economist’s warning proved correct and a new body established to represent private 
traders – the National Organizations Co-ordinated Committee (NOCC) – continued to 
campaign against the Co-op. Beaverbrook became its self-appointed leader and stepped up 
attacks on the movement in the Daily Express. The paper asserted that 100,000 
shopkeepers backed the NOCC (the Mail put the figure at 250,000) and it tried to inflame 
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them, for example, with reports that the CWS was planning to open stores in areas where 
co-operation was weak. According to the Express, the spread of the movement threatened 
to ‘smash the fabric of the country’s commerce.’ It published numerous letters of support 
from local traders’ associations and Beaverbrook even got his staff to purchase goods 
undercover from co-operative stores, claiming private traders were cheaper.94 He worked 
closely with H. J. Gamblin, chairman of the NOCC, overseeing the production of anti-co-
operative propaganda and providing funds. Though his biographer and friend, A. J. P. Taylor, 
preferred to ignore Beaverbrook’s role in this ‘crusade’, he devoted a great deal of energy to 
it, despatching thousands of letters to traders and appointing a secretary to deal with 
correspondence.95 Interestingly, Beaverbrook responded personally to many letters of 
support from disgruntled shopkeepers who blamed the Co-op for their various woes; he 
returned a postal order for £1 sent by ‘one of the victims of co-operative oppression’ from 
South Wales, for example, thanking him politely for the donation but stressing how he 
wanted to bear costs himself. To Beaverbrook’s dismay, serious rifts became apparent early 
on. Some trade associations were fearful of alienating Co-op shoppers; the trade journal, 
the Bakers’ Record, for instance, having asked Beaverbrook for an article, later refused to 
publish it. Eventually, Beaverbrook despaired of private traders, believing them to be ‘afraid 
of their Socialist customers’, despite their latent power. He confided revealingly to Gamblin; 
‘It’s odd, is it not, that the little fellows will not fight for themselves. They have got a real 
chance at present, with a world movement to help them.’ Other publicity stunts backfired 
badly. Beaverbrook joined the London Co-operative Society to stir things up but officers of 
the society took great pleasure in sending him invitations to meetings, information about 
new developments and even asked whether he wanted to join their mutuality club!96 
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The Daily Express declared ‘Co-op War Front Widens’ as Beaverbrook focussed his energies 
on the London County Council elections in March 1934, regarding them as a vital 
battleground. Though a lacklustre public speaker, he addressed numerous meetings in 
support of Empire Free Trade and those Conservative and Municipal Reform Party 
candidates who had pledged to enlist ratepayers against the ‘the co-operative octopus’. It 
was claimed that the CWS received preferential treatment when council contracts were 
awarded and candidates promised to halt the spread of the movement in the London area. 
The atmosphere during the election was highly charged; Beaverbrook denounced the 
‘menace’ of co-operation to an appreciative audience at East Sheen, but was booed by ‘an 
immense crowd’ when he emerged from the hall. Speaking at Ealing, he portrayed the 
movement as a revolutionary organisation that was ‘bent on overturning the existing social 
structure of the country.’ Heckled by the audience, Beaverbrook threatened; ‘You are crying 
out before you are hurt, but, please God, we will hurt you and give you something really to 
shout out about.’97 The campaign failed utterly, though it served as a ‘magnificent 
advertisement for the co-operative movement’ as the Advertisers’ Weekly observed, and 
Labour was swept to power. George Hicks, Labour MP for Woolwich East, sent Beaverbrook 
a telegram after the results were announced offering, ‘very many thanks for helping us to 
win London for Labour and Co-operation.’ Beaverbrook wrote sympathetic letters to 
unsuccessful candidates such as Sir Cyril Cobb, stating his belief that their failure was ‘due 
entirely to the wickedness of the Conservatives who did not bestir themselves’, and 
foreseeing that they ‘will get what they deserve in the next three years.’98 For a while 
Beaverbrook ploughed on, addressing a public meeting in Manchester where he was 
heckled once again but he did not enjoy being on the losing side and gave up the cause after 
what was an ignominious defeat by any reckoning, though the Daily Express continued to 
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regularly publish anti-co-operative propaganda for the rest of the decade.99 Rothermere 
went further, concluding from this setback that the only hope for the private trader lay with 
the fascists, pointing out that ‘one of the articles of the Blackshirt programme is to protect 
him against the tentacles of the Co-operative octopus.’100 
 
Co-operators responded to Beaverbrook’s assault by launching their own counter-offensive. 
The anti-co-operative campaign confirmed the view that the development of an 
independent press was vital to the success of ‘co-operative democracy’. It became widely 
accepted that co-operators needed to ‘strike at the heart of democracy’s most militant foe – 
the great capitalist newspaper combines.’ The press was regarded as a key weapon for the 
working-class consumer, one which had to be wrestled out of the hands of Beaverbrook and 
Rothermere: ‘The function of the Co-operative Press is to help the co-operative movement 
to safeguard the larders and wardrobes and homes of the masses; the function of the 
Capitalist Press is to enable financiers and traders to succeed in their exploitation of the 
homes of the masses.’ The failure of trade unionists to keep control of the Daily Herald 
meant that co-operators now had to face this challenge alone. Again, enemies abroad as 
well as at home lent particular urgency here: co-operators believed that the Nazi seizure of 
power had been aided by the Hugenberg press in Germany, which had waged a relentless 
struggle against workers’ organisations, including co-operatives.101 Consequently, demands 
for a ‘press push’ were increasingly heard at co-operative meetings throughout the country 
and in the summer of 1932 plans were made to relaunch Reynolds’s News using capital from 
a special advertising fund subscribed to by societies in proportion to their annual turnover. 
Meanwhile, the paper’s talented editor, Sydney Elliott, hired an impressive group of 
contributors, including H. N. Brailsford and Hamilton Fyfe, and the weekly circulation rose to 
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500,000. A rejuvenated press, it was hoped, would be the means by which, ‘Our massed 
millions of members can provide the nation with an antidote to the poison which comes 
from the printing presses controlled by the foes of democracy.’ The National Co-operative 
Publishing Society led the campaign for an advertising fund, raising more than £50,000 by 
the spring of 1935. Interestingly, societies in the south at first subscribed more readily than 
northern societies, which had been harder hit by economic recession; the London Society 
alone subscribed over £11,000. The slogan, ‘Build a Press Without a Peer’ was adopted, a 
new site bought at Gray’s Inn Road, and a revamped Reynolds’s News appeared early the 
following year.102 
 
The press lords and their allies managed to inflict significant damage on the Co-op but they 
lost the war, at least in the short and medium term. After all, the financial impact of the new 
taxation on the Co-op was limited, societies could easily avoid it and the movement 
continued to expand – to over 8.6 million members by 1939.103 Though Beaverbrook kept up 
pressure after war broke out, denouncing the movement in the Daily Express and even 
tempting Sydney Elliot away from Reynolds’s News to work with Michael Foot at the Evening 
Standard in 1942, co-operative advance seemed almost inexorable.104 Why were the Co-
op’s enemies not more successful and what does their disappointment tell us about the 
wider political culture of the 1930s? Most obviously, Beaverbrook and Rothermere were not 
as powerful as they liked to imagine. Although they tried to exert control over their 
newspapers and often dictated the editorial line, the mass press was not merely a 
mouthpiece for the dissemination of the views of its owners.105 Beaverbrook notoriously 
kept his editors on a tight rein but he sometimes hired talented journalists like Foot and 
Elliott despite their political views and employed David Low as cartoonist on the Evening 
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Standard from 1927 and Low, according to the report produced by Political and Economic 
Planning in 1938, frequently held up ‘the whole of capitalist society to ridicule.’106 
 
Rothermere’s reach was greater in theory, as the Harmsworth Group represented the ‘most 
complete newspaper combine’ in the country, comprising 8 morning, 12 evening, 2 Sunday 
and 6 weekly newspapers by the late 1930s.107 After the frenzied period of takeovers during 
the ‘newspaper war’ a decade earlier, Rothermere owned numerous local titles and he 
pledged to use these in the war against the Co-op. However, this was far easier said than 
done: the strength of the business and culture of co-operation tied his hands at the local 
level. Mass consumerism conferred power on working-class consumers as well as mass 
market capitalists and it exerted a democratising influence as J. B. Priestley famously 
observed in relation to Blackpool, which he considered ‘a complete and essential product of 
industrial democracy’, a cheap and accessible world open to all those who could pay or 
obtain credit.108 Local papers controlled by the Harmsworth Group frequently reported 
news relating to co-operative societies, including sales events, the opening of new premises, 
quarterly meetings, annual festivals and sports days, outings and so on. This was hardly 
surprising when these associations played such a crucial role in the lives of many of their 
readers, and when co-operators often advertised in their pages. The Gloucester Society, 
which had 27,000 members in 1931, took out a whole page advertisement in the local paper 
that year trumpeting the advantages of mutual trading. The Gloucester Citizen splashed 
across its pages the arrival of Father Christmas at the local society’s central premises three 
years later.109 The Hull Daily Mail carried a full page advertisement to coincide with ‘Hull 
Civic Week’ in 1933 headed ‘Co-operation – the Basis of Good Citizenship’, which pointed 
out that the local society had provided a total of seven Lord Mayors. The membership of the 
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society grew by 25% between 1933 and 1935, rising to 50,000. When the American 
bandleader Roy Fox played Hull in 1936, the advertising manager of the local paper 
arranged for Fox and his family to visit the city’s major shopping attractions. First on the list 
was the Co-op.110 
 
The struggle over taxation was reported in detail by the local press belonging to the 
Harmsworth Group, and coverage was generally impartial. Ample space was devoted to the 
views of small traders and Chambers of Commerce, naturally. The Gloucester Citizen cited a 
leader of the Federation of Grocers’ Associations at a meeting in the city who reckoned that 
traders, ‘now have the Co-operative Movement on the run’. Similarly, the Lincolnshire Echo 
quoted Herman Kent, secretary of the Federation, who believed co-operators were aiming 
at ‘the elimination of private enterprise and the substitution of a co-operative 
commonwealth.’111 But the local press also reported co-operators’ criticisms, including 
sometimes even most the radical views of activists such as Mr Marshall of the Hull Society, 
who lambasted the conduct of the ‘biased press’ in the campaign; and George Lansbury, 
who believed that the war revealed how the movement stood for ‘a complete 
transformation of the hellish, competitive, capitalistic society in which we live.’112 Anti-co-
operative sentiment was not entirely excluded from the papers, however, but was worked 
in more insidiously. Attacks on the movement by local and national Conservative politicians 
were published next to editorials, in the Derby Evening Telegraph, for instance, which 
provided a platform for E. S. Riley, a member of the town council, to denounce ‘the Socialist 
Co-operative movement’; and in the Lincolnshire Echo, where Walter Liddell, Tory MP for 
Lincoln, poured scorn on co-operators’ protests against the tax.113 Moreover, as in the 
national press, conflicts within local societies were eagerly picked up on as were divisions 
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between ordinary ‘non-political’ members and the movement’s ‘socialist’ leadership. 
Correspondence columns were an important means of moulding readers’ views and anti-co-
operative letters were regularly published.114 Whatever the press lords’ intentions, their 
room to manoeuvre was limited clearly as local editors were careful not to totally alienate 
an important market. 
 
 
VI 
 
 
As the war against the Co-op was cooling, H. N. Brailsford published his brilliant prophetic 
work, Property or Peace?, which argued that the depression had ‘smothered’ parliamentary 
democracy in Britain. It had not been completely crushed as it had been in Italy and 
Germany, of course, but there had been ‘a very remarkable departure’ from normal 
democratic procedure nevertheless: an emergency election had been called to defeat 
socialism, parliament had been largely silenced – real power centralised in the hands of 
ministers and delegated bodies – and the Prime Minister had been ‘exalted to the rank of a 
Duce.’ All this achieved without fuss, in keeping with the national temper: ‘The forms of 
democracy were preserved, but something also of the authoritative procedure of Fascism 
was attained, and that without the trouble of dressing in coloured shirts.’115 Although there 
was some truth in Brailsford’s analysis, it also underplayed the continuing vibrancy of 
associational life and democratic practice in civil society, which recent historiography has 
been keen to recover. Developing this lead, this article has explored the vital role organised 
consumers played in popular political culture in the interwar period. However, it has also 
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emphasised how contested that political culture continued to be; protracted struggles 
occurred over the meaning of democracy and working-class consumers were in the 
vanguard of those struggles. Co-operative ideologists dismissed Beaverbrook and 
Rothermere’s defence of small traders as mere cant, for the mass press as well as the 
political elite sided with monopolies. They regarded themselves therefore as the true 
defenders of democracy, fighting a just war against those groups in society led by the press 
barons who sought to engross economic and political power. 
 
It remains to be considered why Baldwin and the Conservative Party resisted Beaverbrook 
and  Rothermere’s appeals, why they did not go further and tax the dividend, as many co-
operators feared they would. There was some Conservative support for more punitive 
action as we have seen, but it was mainly confined to the backbenches of the party. It fell to 
Chamberlain to steer the unpopular tax onto the statute book but he was committed to the 
finality of the measure, confiding to his sister Hilda that he had a soft spot for the Co-op as 
did some other Conservative MPs  – ‘Ned Grigg told me he never had any trouble about 
Coops though there are a great many in Altrincham’ – and even deluding himself that 
eventually co-operators would render him thanks ‘for having given them the charter for 
their divi.’116 Significantly, Baldwin maintained a low profile during the campaign against the 
Co-op, refusing to speak on the issue and keeping away from the House during the vote. 
This enabled the Conservative leader to maintain his moderate persona, carefully crafted to 
help bind classes together and maintain national stability in a ‘peaceable kingdom’, in Jon 
Lawrence’s terms.117 Baldwin had cultivated cordial relations with co-operators for years, 
visiting CWS warehouses in London and praising the movement as early as 1924.118 Taxing 
the divi would have been un-English, therefore, something that fascist regimes did. He also 
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understood very well indeed what much recent scholarship has explored in detail: the 
uneven and fractured nature of working-class consciousness. He knew that most ordinary 
co-operative members were not avowed socialists but continued to identify with the Liberal 
or even the Conservative Party in some localities and he did not wish to alienate these 
potential supporters entirely. During the parliamentary debate on taxation Commander 
Bower referred to the movement as an anti-socialist force and Baldwin shared this 
opinion.119 The assistant Cabinet Secretary Tom Jones recalled that Baldwin stated that he 
thought ‘it may be possible to detach’ the Co-operative movement from Labour because its 
members ‘are small investors and proprietors and don’t easily swallow Marxism.’120 A good 
deal of evidence made such an objective appear reasonable. The Altrincham by-election 
that was won by Edward Grigg for the Tories in June 1933 was, according to the Co-
operative News, ‘a gross reflection’ upon Co-operative and Labour voters, especially given 
the number of co-operative members in the area and the recent conflicts. The paper blamed 
defeat on the Labour Party’s poor organisation.121 Baldwin’s hopes for a rift between Labour 
and the Co-op seemed more feasible than ever after 1933, as relations between the 
producer and consumer wings of the labour movement continued to deteriorate.122 In short, 
Baldwin regarded the Co-op not as an enemy of the state but as a bulwark and did what he 
could to encourage this view in order to strengthen Conservative hegemony; Philip 
Williamson is correct surely to emphasise the ideological effort involved in securing support 
for ‘conventional wisdoms’ across classes at this time.123 
 
Baldwin had recognised the political importance of the consumer in the 1920s. He initiated 
the Royal Commission on Food Prices in 1925 to assuage mounting criticism of ‘profiteering’ 
and sought to address the interests of the consuming public, especially the housewife, 
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thereafter. Here, as in so many respects, Baldwin proved a true party leader.124 Correctly 
intuiting the popular mood, he also inveighed against monopoly power (while doing nothing 
to halt its creation), stating in an interview published in the People the year before that the 
Conservative Party ought to distance itself from ‘vested interests’ and that it was imperative 
to ‘break rings and trusts’ in order to reduce the cost of goods paid by ordinary consumers. 
Moreover, like very many co-operators, Baldwin despised Beaverbrook and Rothermere, 
who tried to stymie then overturn his leadership of the party; in the same article he 
snapped the owners of the ‘Trust Press’ ‘are both men I would not have in my house.’125 He 
waited seven years to exact full revenge, however. In a speech delivered during a by-
election at St George’s, Westminster, in March 1931, Baldwin famously described the mass 
press as ‘engines of propaganda for the constantly changing policies, desires, personal 
wishes, and personal likes and dislikes of two men.’ Borrowing from Kipling, he went on to 
denounce the press Lords for seeking ‘power without responsibility – the prerogative of the 
harlot throughout the ages.’126 Co-operative ideologues pounced on the phrase ‘engines of 
propaganda’ during their protracted struggle with the mass press, employing it routinely.127 
If it seems unlikely that co-operators saw Baldwin as an ally, there is little evidence to 
suggest they saw him as an enemy either and this underlines the reach of Baldwinite 
Conservatism at this time. Certainly, co-operative politicians thought that the growth of big 
business and creeping authoritarianism at home were undermining British freedoms and 
they stressed the necessity of ‘co-operative democracy’ to counter these threats. The 
majority of members, however, were still to be totally convinced by such arguments, as they 
knew very well that despite profound domestic problems there was still a world of 
difference between the partial nature of British democracy and the totalitarian regimes that 
had found fertile soil on the continent. In Britain, at least, the organised consumer had still 
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some room for manoeuvre and could continue to build the Co-operative Commonwealth of 
the future. 
 
Peter Gurney, Department of History, University of Essex, UK. 
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